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State Responsibility and Community Interest in 
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Abstract
Treaties dominate international energy law, meaning the rules of public international law that 
govern energy activities and their effects. This raises the question about the relationship of 
treaties, and particularly those on energy trade, with the law of international responsibility. 
This article uses a European angle to contextualise the importance of this question. EU 
Member States are major oil and gas importers from third states. The EU and Member States 
are party to treaties with third states that apply to energy trade, carriage and investment. 
Whether treaty obligations, undertaken and owed to the EU and/or Member States vis-à-vis 
third states, are of bilateral, interdependent or community interest nature determines whether 
the EU and/or a Member State have standing to invoke the responsibility of a third state for 
a breach of an energy-related obligation as well as their remedial rights and the means by 
which they may implement responsibility. At the same time, because energy access is vital 
for states, suspending compliance with obligations in the energy sector is often preferred 
as a permissible response to wrongfulness carrying significant effects and persuasiveness. 
The nature of obligations of international energy law may determine whether suspending 
compliance with such obligations can be a lawful countermeasure either by the EU and/or 
Member States against a third state, or by a third state against the EU and/or Member States.
Keywords
State responsibility, international energy law, World Trade Organization, pipeline treaties, 
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1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) Member States are major oil and gas importers. The 
EU imports 90 per cent of the oil and 66 per cent of the gas that it consumes.1 
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Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge. This article is based on the author’s research 
for the monograph, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and Countermeasures (OUP 2015).
1  See generally ‘Energy Security Strategy’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/
energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-security-strategy> accessed 28 September 2016. 
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The dependence of EU Member States on imports of different energy sources has, 
to varying degrees, existed for decades. The exporting and transit states of these 
sources of energy have also changed over time.2 Despite this dependence, it was 
not until the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), that a new 
Title on Energy was added.3 The Title comprises only one provision—Article 194—
which operates as a separate basis for energy-related EU legislation. However, even 
before the insertion of this provision, EU energy law had been expanding mainly 
with a view to creating an internal energy market and securing oil and gas supplies,4 
with further developments to be expected as the European Commission has made 
a new proposal for an ‘Energy Union’.5
Given the need for energy imports, the relationship of the EU and Member 
States with third states in the energy sector has been perceived as critical for the 
development of the internal energy market, as well as for securing supply.6 The 
modern significance of this relationship is illustrated by the effects of the 2009 gas 
crisis on the European gas market that occurred owing to a dispute concerning 
exports of gas from Russia to Ukraine and being transited through Ukraine.7 In 
terms of factual effects, industrial and household consumers were left without 
gas for days.8 In terms of legal impact, the conduct of third states triggered the 
2  Sanam Salem Haghighi, Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union 
with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries (Hart 2007) 38–64.
3  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ 
C115/47 (TFEU); For the reasons behind the reluctance of Member States to have a common 
energy policy, see Haghighi (n 2) 46–53, 56–62. 
4  Until the insertion of this provision, EU energy-related legislation was adopted mainly on the 
environmental and internal market bases and mainly through harmonisation. See generally 
Christopher Jones (ed), EU Energy Law, vol 1 (4th edn, Claeys & Casteels Publishing 2016) 
1–9; Angus Johnston and Guy Block, EU Energy Law (OUP 2012) 4–6.
5  See Commission, ‘A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy’ COM (2015) 80 final.
6  Haghighi (n 2) 63.
7  Dan Bilefsky and Andrew E Kramer, ‘Deal to End Russia’s Cutoff of Gas Remains Uncertain’ 
The New York Times (New York, 9 January 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/world/
europe/10gazprom.html> accessed 28 September 2016; For an analysis of the 2009 dispute 
between Ukraine and Russia, see Danae Azaria, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and 
Countermeasures (OUP 2015) 4–5, 90–93.
8  For different effects on each Member State and third states in the Balkan region, see 
European Commission, ‘Member State General Situation According to Significance of 
Impact, Memo/09/3)’ (9 January 2009) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/09/3&type=HTML> accessed 28 September 2016.
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development of EU secondary legislation—the 2009 crisis led to the adoption of 
the 2010 Gas Security of Supply Regulation.9 
The relationship with third states is governed by international law. The EU 
and Member States are party to treaties with third states that apply to energy trade 
and investment, and Member States conclude treaties with third states so as to 
diversify sources and routes of supply. This treaty practice—partly driven by an 
effort to secure uninterrupted energy supply—raises a number of legal questions.10 
This study analyses the relationship between treaties concerning energy activities 
and the law of international responsibility. More specifically, the study focuses on 
the treaties that regulate the trade of energy. It explains that the nature of treaty 
obligations, which are undertaken and owed to the EU and/or Member States vis-
à-vis third states, determines whether the EU and/or a Member State has standing 
to implement the responsibility of a third state for a breach of an energy-related 
obligation. It also determines which remedial rights they have and by which means 
they can implement the responsibility of a third state. At the same time, because 
access to energy is vital for states—their economies and the survival of their 
populations depend on it11—suspending compliance with obligations in the energy 
sector rank highly among the permissible responses to wrongfulness carrying 
significant persuasiveness. The nature of obligations of international energy law, 
meaning the rules of public international law that govern energy activities and their 
effects,12 may determine whether suspending compliance with such obligations can 
be a lawful countermeasure. Such countermeasure may be taken either by the EU 
and/or Member States against a third responsible state, or by a third state against 
the EU and/or Member States. 
These issues are of exceptional practical importance to the EU, its 
Member States and its neighbourhood, as they lie at the heart of energy security 
considerations. Which Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
or Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, were entitled 
9  Council Directive (EU) 994/2010 of 12 November 2010 concerning measures to safeguard 
security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive (EC) 2004/67 [2010] OJ L295/1 recitals 
26–27. 
10  Questions that fall beyond the scope of this study include the allocation of external competence 
in relation to energy trade, the compatibility of EU law with treaties between Member States 
and third states, and the relationship between these treaties and customary international law.
11  Case 72/83 Campus Oil Limited and Others v Minister for Industry and Energy and Others 
[1984] ECR 2727, para 34.
12  Catherine Redgwell, ‘International Regulation of Energy Activities’ in Martha Roggenkamp 
and others (eds), Energy Law in Europe (3rd edn, OUP 2016) 16.
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to resort to dispute settlement under the ECT or the WTO Agreement against 
Ukraine or Russia in relation to the 2009 incident alleging breaches of transit or 
export obligations (respectively)?13 Would Ukraine have been able lawfully to 
suspend compliance with its transit obligations under the WTO or the ECT in 
response to Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea with consequences for the EU 
and its Member States? Can a Member State, which is party to a bespoke pipeline 
treaty with a third state, suspend energy flows via the pipeline in response to a 
breach of an obligation owed to it by that third state? 
The following analysis will first determine the nature of some primary 
obligations of international energy law that are of relevance to EU and/or 
Member States. Second, it will examine how secondary rules on energy-related 
countermeasures take into account the nature of primary obligations.14 The 
analysis will place international energy law and the energy security concerns of the 
EU and Member States within the broader field of public international law. The 
European angle is a context that assists in better understanding the application of 
international responsibility in the context of international energy law. 
2 From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International 
Energy Law: Treaties of European Concern
In early January 2009, the transit and export of gas to EU Member States were 
interrupted arguably contrary to Ukraine’s transit obligations (under the WTO 
Agreement and the ECT) and Russia’s export obligations (under the ECT). Yet, there 
13  Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17 December 1994, entered into force 16 April 1998) 2080 
UNTS 95 (ECT); Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 3. The EU and Member States 
were ECT Contracting Parties and WTO Members, as was Ukraine. Russia was provisionally 
bound by the ECT at the time of the dispute, but Russia was not a WTO Member. Russia 
acceded to the WTO Agreement on 22 August 2012. Russia’s provisional application of the 
ECT ceased to be in effect since 19 October 2009 (pursuant to ECT art 45(3)(a)). On 20 August 
2009, Russia expressed its intention not to become a party to the ECT. For Russia’s provisional 
application of ECT, see Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, PCA 
Case AA227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, para 394. 
14  Primary rules determine the conduct of a state, while secondary rules deal with the 
consequences of the breach of primary rules. For an explanation of the distinction between the 
two, see ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-second 
Session’ (4 May–10 July 1970) UN Doc A/8010/Rev 1, 306, para 66.c.
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is no evidence that the EU or Member States formally invoked the responsibility 
of either of the two states by requesting cessation of the wrongful act or reparation, 
by resorting to dispute settlement or by resorting to countermeasures.15 Rather, 
on 10 January 2009, Russia, Ukraine and the European Commission signed the 
Agreement on Monitoring of Natural Gas through Ukraine, pursuant to which 
international monitoring staff (with strictly fact-finding competence) were 
dispatched to metering stations at the Russia-Ukraine border in Ukraine and 
Russia.16 However, the fact that responsibility was not invoked does not perforce 
mean that responsibility has not been engaged; nor does it necessarily mean that 
the EU and/or Member States lacked standing to invoke responsibility. Invoking 
international responsibility is discretionary.17
In 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR)18 and submitted 
them to the General Assembly that commended them to the governments.19 The 
ASR generally represents customary international law concerning the entitlement to 
invoke responsibility.20 Standing to invoke responsibility is premised on a tripartite 
classification of primary obligations. International obligations are classified on the 
basis of the question ‘to whom are these obligations owed?’
15  Invoking responsibility involves claims of ‘relative formality’, such as recourse to dispute 
settlement or countermeasures. ILC, ‘Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries Thereto’ (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 
August 2001) UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), 117. 
16  On 19 January 2009, Gazprom and Naftogaz signed 10-year supply and transit contracts. The 
EU and Member States were informed of the agreement, without participating in negotiations. 
On 20 January 2009, supplies to, and transit via, Ukraine began. See José Manuel Durão 
Barroso, ‘Statement of President Barroso on the resolution of the Ukraine-Russia Dispute’ 
(European Commission, 20 January 2009) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=SPEECH/09/12&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> 
accessed 28 September 2016. On 22 January 2009, gas flows to all importing states returned to 
the levels before the interruption.
17  For possible reasons relating to the legal architecture of WTO and ECT dispute settlement 
mechanisms, see Azaria (n 7) 168–72, 177–84. 
18  ILC (n 15) 26–30. 
19  UNGA Res 56/83 (28 January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/83. 
20  ILC (n 15) 117–19, 126–28; The ICJ has followed the ASR’s position concerning standing to 
invoke responsibility for breaches of erga omnes partes obligations in Questions relating to the 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 2012, paras 
67–70.
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First, some obligations are ‘bilateral’. These obligations are owed in pairs 
between the parties. When they are grounded in multilateral norms, such as 
a multilateral treaty, they may be called ‘bilateralisable’. In the latter case, the 
multilateral norm creates bundles of bilateral relationships.21 An example is that of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea.22 In case of a breach, the individually 
injured state may invoke responsibility, including by recourse to countermeasures.23 
Second, other obligations are ‘interdependent’, meaning obligations owed to a 
group of states collectively but premised on ‘global reciprocity’.24 Non-performance 
by one permits everyone else not to perform—a paradigmatic example is obligations 
of disarmament. Under the ASR, breaches of a certain character may change 
radically the position of all other states to whom this type of obligation is owed 
with respect to the further performance by those other states of the obligation.25 
Accordingly, the breach allows all other states to which the obligation is owed to 
invoke responsibility, as injured states, including by recourse to countermeasures.26
Third, community interest obligations, which are obligations owed indivisibly 
to all states for the protection of a collective interest (erga omnes obligations) or to 
a group of states established for the protection of a collective interest of the group 
(or even for a wider common interest) above the individual interests of the group 
(erga omnes partes obligations).27 These are genuinely multilateral obligations.28 In 
case of a breach, the specially affected state is the injured state and may invoke 
responsibility, including by recourse to countermeasures.29 States other than the 
injured state may claim cessation of the wrongful act and assurances and guarantees 
21  Bruno Simma, ‘Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law of State Responsibility’ in 
Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai 
Rosenne (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 822–23.
22  James Crawford, ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law’ (2006) 319 Recueil 
des Cours 325. 
23  ILC (n 15) arts 42(a), 49.
24  Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, ‘The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension 
of the Relations of International Responsibility’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1127, 1134–36; ILC (n 15) 
117–18, note 669.
25  ILC (n 15) art 42(b)(ii). 
26  ibid art 49.
27  ILC (n 15) 126.
28  Simma (n 21) 822–23.
29  ILC (n 15) arts 42(b)(i), 49.
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of non-repetition.30 As a matter of progressive development, the ASR suggest that a 
state other than the injured state may claim reparation in the interest of the injured 
state, assuming that an injured state exists.31 It is questionable whether states other 
than the injured state may resort to countermeasures.32 
According to the ILC Commentary to the ASR, the determination of the 
nature of the obligation takes place by interpreting the primary rule.33 In the 
absence of a reasonable alternative, it is logical to argue that, at least in relation to 
treaty obligations, the customary rules on treaty interpretation set forth in Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) are to be used.34 
Furthermore, international case law has placed emphasis on the treaty’s object 
and purpose in order to identify the nature of treaty obligations,35 and scholars 
have suggested that inter se modifications are prohibited in cases of treaties that 
establish community interest obligations.36
Reciprocity dominates economic activities in the energy sector. Prior to the 
rise of multilateral treaties that either specifically deal with energy trade (eg ECT) 
or also apply to energy trade (eg GATT annexed to the WTO Agreement), energy 
trade had fallen within the scope of bilateral treaties on friendship, navigation and 
30  ibid art 48(2)(a). 
31  ibid art 48(2)(b). 
32  ibid art 54. See also ILC (n 15) 129, 137, 139; For an argument that countermeasures of states 
other than the injured state are permitted under lex lata, see Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, 
‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International 
Community’ in James Crawford and others (eds), The Law of International Responsibility 
(OUP 2010) 1146–48.
33  ILC (n 15) 118; Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice in his work on the law of treaties had similarly 
suggested that the nature of treaties is determined by the ‘correct interpretation of the treaty 
according to its terms’: ILC, ‘Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties’ (1959) UN Doc A/CN.4/120 
para 18.
34  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). 
35  S.S. Wimbledon (United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan v Germany) (Judgment) [1923] PCIJ 
Rep Series A No 1; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v 
Senegal) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 2012; In relation to the EU founding treaties, see Case 
26/62 NV Algemene Transport—en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1, 12.
36  Individual Opinion by M. Anzilotti, Customs Regime between Germany and Austria (Advisory 
Opinion) (1931) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 41, 64; Separate Opinion of Judge van Eysinga, The 
Oscar Chinn Case (United Kingdom v Belgium) (Judgment) (1934) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 63, 
131.
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commerce. A case concerning the breach of such obligations that found its way 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was the Oil Platforms case which was 
couched in terms of energy commerce.37 However, treaty obligations in this area 
of international law may protect the community interests of treaty parties. The 
following analysis classifies obligations relevant to energy activities in treaties 
to which either the EU and/or Member States are parties along with third states. 
These are examined in the following sequence: the WTO Agreement, the ECT, and 
bespoke pipeline treaties: the Nabucco Pipeline Agreement38 (Nabucco Agreement), 
the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline Treaty39 (TAP Treaty) and the bilateral treaties for the 
South Stream pipeline.40 
37  Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objection, 
Judgment) [1996] ICJ Rep 1996, 817, para 38; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United 
States of America) (Judgment) ICJ Rep 2003, 161 paras 23–84.
38  Agreement among the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Hungary, 
Romania and the Republic of Turkey Regarding the Nabucco Project (signed 13 July 2009) 
<https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_III_57/COO_2026_100_ 
2_605048.pdf> accessed 28 September 2016.
39  Agreement among the Republic of Albania, the Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic 
relating to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project (signed 13 February 2013, entered into force 
5 January 2014) <http://nomoi.info/ΦΕΚ-Α-267–2013-σελ-93.html> accessed 28 September 
2016.
40  Treaties for the South Stream pipeline between Russia and EU Member States (abbreviated): 
Intergovernmental Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of Bulgaria (signed 18 January 2008); Intergovernmental 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of the 
Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation of the Gas Pipeline 
in the Territory of Hungary (signed 28 February 2008); Agreement between Government of 
the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the 
Construction and Operation of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Hellenic Republic 
(signed 29 April 2008); Intergovernmental Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Republic of Slovenia (signed 14 November 2009); 
Intergovernmental Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Austria and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Republic of Austria (signed 24 April 2010); 
Intergovernmental Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Republic of Croatia (signed 2 March 2010) (Croatia 
was not an EU Member State when it concluded this treaty with Russia).
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2.1 The WTO Agreement and Trade in Energy Goods
Under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947 GATT)41 disputes 
concerning energy trade were not prominent.42 There is no agreement specifically 
dedicated to energy trade annexed to the WTO Agreement. In the first two decades 
since the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, disputes concerning energy 
trade did not give rise to proceedings under the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).43 However, the scope of application of the WTO Agreement, including 
its annexes, such as the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),44 
encompasses some aspects of the energy sector. For example, freedom of transit 
(GATT Article V) and the prohibition of import and export restrictions (GATT 
Article XI) apply to oil and gas products.45 Furthermore, disputes relating to 
the energy (or mineral resources) sector are increasingly brought under the 
WTO DSU.46 Given the interconnection of energy markets, standing to invoke 
responsibility for breaches of trade obligations in the energy sector is important in 
relation to energy-related disputes. 
41  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 30 October 1947, provisionally applicable 
1 January 1948) 55 UNTS 194. The provisional application of 1947 GATT was terminated one 
year after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, pursuant to the Decision of 8 December 
1994 adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the WTO and the Contracting Parties to 
GATT 1947 on “Transitional Co-existence of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement” 
(PC/12, L/7583).
42  The only 1947 GATT case that dealt with energy activities was Report of the Panel on US—
Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (1987) GATT BISD 34S/136. 
43  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into 
force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 401.
44  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex IA to the Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 3; 
annexes to the WTO Agreement expressly constitute an integral part of the WTO Agreement 
(Article II, paragraph 2 of the WTO Agreement); GATT is legally distinct from 1947 GATT, 
pursuant to Article II(4) of the WTO Agreement. 
45  Azaria (n 7) 30–35.
46  WTO, Canada: Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector—Report 
of the Appellate Body (6 May 2013) WT/DS412/AB/R; WTO, Appellate Body Report, China: 
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials—Report of the Appellate Body 
(22 February 2012) WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R and WT/DS398/AB/R; WTO, China: 
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum—Report of 
the Appellate Body (26 March 2014) WT/DS431/R. Indicative pending cases: WTO, European 
Union and its Member States—Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector—Request for 
Consultation by the Russian Federation (8 May 2014) WT/DS476/1; WTO, European Union 
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The nature of WTO obligations has been considered by a Panel in 
EC—Bananas47 and by an Arbitrator in US—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales 
Corporations’.48 EC—Bananas dealt with standing to bring a claim under the WTO 
DSU for a breach of the GATT. In its reasoning, the Panel did not expressly make 
a finding that the GATT obligations are bilateralisable, erga omnes partes, or 
interdependent.49 Rather, its reasoning was based on the factual interconnectedness 
of international markets (‘interdependence of global economy’) and the risk 
of economic impact, including in the form of supplies and prices, faced by any 
other WTO member in cases where violations of GATT occur. In support of its 
findings, the Panel cited the Judgment of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) in S.S. Wimbledon,50 as well as the provisionally adopted ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility (1996),51 particularly Article 40(e) and (f), which 
encompass bilateral, interdependent, erga omnes and erga omnes partes obligations 
respectively. By referring to community interest obligations without distinguishing 
among these bases, the Panel opened the debate about whether GATT obligations 
are erga omnes partes.52 However, the fact that the Panel cited the page of the S.S. 
Wimbledon Judgment where the PCIJ addressed the issue of jurisdiction (and, by 
implication, standing),53 rather than the judgment’s operative part, which touches 
implicitly on the nature of the primary obligations in question, offers support to 
the view that rules on standing in the WTO Agreement, including its Annexes, 
may be generous and unconnected to the nature of the primary obligations therein.
and Certain Member States—Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel 
and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry—Requests for Consultation by Argentina (23 
May 2013) WT/DS459/1.
47  WTO, European Communities: Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—
Complaint by the United States (22 May 1997) WT/DS27/R/USA, as modified by the Report of 
the Appellate Body (25 September 1997). 
48  WTO, United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’—Recourse to Arbitration 
by the US under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement—Decision of the 
Arbitrator (30 August 2002) WT/DS108/ARB.
49  WTO, European Communities (n 47) para 7.50.
50  S.S. Wimbledon (n 35).
51  ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Session’ (6 May–26 
July 1996) UN Doc A/51/10, 58.
52  WTO, European Communities (n 47) para 7.50.
53  Jurisdiction and standing are two different issues, but they come up in international courts and 
tribunals as preliminary objections. On the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, 
see Hochtief AG v the Argentine Republic ICSID Case ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 
October 2011, paras 90–96.
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In US—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, the Arbitrator did 
not deal with standing, but with the quantitative amount of the countermeasure 
agreed between the parties to the dispute. He explained that the prohibition of the 
subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) was an erga omnes obligation.54 Presumably, the Arbitrator meant 
erga omnes partes given that the obligations are binding only on WTO members. 
However, his reasoning does not support the suggestion that WTO obligations 
in general (or obligations arising from the SCM Agreement specifically) are erga 
omnes partes. He substantiated his finding by reference to the effects of the measure 
in question, rather than the obligation’s nature and the treaty’s object and purpose: 
‘once such a measure is in operation, its real world effects cannot be separated from 
the inherent uncertainty that is created by the very existence of such an export 
subsidy’.55 
Therefore, GATT obligations may be better classified as bilateralisable, while 
the rules on standing, as developed under the DSU, permit any WTO member 
to resort to the DSU in case of breach of a WTO obligation.56 This is fitting for 
international and regional energy markets given the factual interdependence of oil, 
gas, and electricity prices as well as of producers and consumers. Having examined 
WTO Agreement obligations that may apply to energy trade, the following section 
discusses the obligations under the ECT. 
2.2 The Energy Charter Treaty
The ECT is the first sector-specific multilateral treaty governing numerous aspects 
of the energy sector: eg trade in Articles 5 and 29; transit in Article 7; protection 
of foreign investment in Part III; protection of the environment in Article 19 and 
54  WTO, United States—Tax Treatment (n 48) para 6.10. 
55  ibid para 6.8.
56  Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of their 
Violation’ (2006) 17 EJIL 723; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: 
Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907; Crawford (n 22) 
451; Azaria (n 7) 126–130; In opposition, see Chios Carmody, ‘WTO Obligations as Collective’ 
(2006) 17 2 EJIL 419. Although the causes of action provided in GATT Article XXIII(1) 
include ‘violations’, ‘non-violations’, and ‘other situations’, only standing for breaches of the 
GATT have been examined here.
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competition in Article 6.57 The ECT has 51 Contracting Parties, including the EU 
and Member States (with the exception of Italy, since 1 January 2016).58 
The nature of ECT obligations has yet to be addressed in the publicly available 
ECT case law. The following sections examine some ECT obligations separately. 
They demonstrate that ECT obligations vary in terms of their nature. This difference 
in nature has implications for standing to invoke responsibility either by recourse 
to ECT dispute settlement procedures, or by recourse to countermeasures, where 
the latter are not excluded by lex specialis in the ECT.59
2.2.1 Investment Protection Obligations
The ECT investment obligations in Part III and the dispute settlement provisions 
of Article 26 apply solely in relation to investors bearing the nationality of an ECT 
Contracting Party in relation to an investment in the Area of another (host) ECT 
Contracting Party. They do not apply (by virtue of the ECT) to foreign investors 
who do not bear the nationality of an ECT Contracting Party. They also do not 
apply to investors that are nationals of an ECT Contracting Party in relation to 
investment made in the Area of that ECT Contracting Party. It could be argued that 
the manner in which the protection of investors of another Contracting Party is 
widened because the definition of ‘investment’ (ECT Article 1(6)(b)) requires the 
host Contracting Party to treat locally incorporated companies in conformity with 
ECT investment obligations, thus leading to the multilateralisation of the investment 
obligations.60 However, the purpose of such a provision is not to treat foreign and 
domestic investors in the same manner, with a view to protecting corporate entities 
per se; but to protect the interests of as many investors of each Contracting Party 
as possible. It could also be argued that the manner in which the most-favoured 
nation (MFN) treatment works in practice means that the investors of numerous 
Contracting Parties may be affected by a breach of the investment obligations and 
that this could mean that investment obligations should be considered erga omnes 
partes.61 However, the MFN treatment obligation is characterised by an exchange of 
57  ibid. 
58  Italy submitted a notification of withdrawal from the ECT to the Depository on 31 December 
2014. Its withdrawal took effect on 1 January 2016, pursuant to ECT art 47(2). 
59  Azaria (n 7) 173–84.
60  See also Stephen W Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2010) 
202. 
61  See also Schill (n 60) 218–19.
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treatment, and reflects predominantly the individual interest of each Contracting 
Party to see its own nationals protected abroad, rather than a community interest 
that involves the protection of all commercial entities within a Contracting Party’s 
jurisdiction. 
Seen through these lenses, the ECT investment obligations rest on foreign 
nationality (that of another Contracting Party) and on a predominantly individual 
interest of each ECT Contracting Party to see their nationals protected abroad. 
They may be better classified as bilateralisable.62
2.2.2 Trade and Transit Obligations
There is no evidence that the ECT trade and transit obligations are not bilateralisable.63 
Given that trade and transit, as a general matter, are based on reciprocal exchanges 
between treaty parties (unless there is evidence to the contrary), it is arguable that 
they are owed in pairs between ECT Contracting Parties. 
Incidents have come up where violations of ECT obligations concerning 
transit (Article 7) and exports (Article 29) have either occurred or the lawfulness 
of the measures taken by the transit and exporter/importer ECT Contracting Party 
could at least have been challenged. However, since on none of these occasions did 
Contracting Parties make any claims of ‘relatively formal form’ for the cessation of 
an internationally wrongful act, no concrete conclusions can be drawn from their 
practice as to the nature of the trade and transit obligations.64 
Subsequent agreements between some ECT Contracting Parties provide 
evidence that priority is given to the ECT in the case of conflict between ECT 
provisions and the provisions of subsequent agreements. This practice of ECT 
Contracting Parties may support the view that the trade and transit provisions 
of the ECT are of integral nature. For instance, all Nabucco Agreement parties 
and TAP Treaty parties are ECT Contracting Parties. The Nabucco Agreement 
explicitly does not derogate from the ECT and the founding EU treaties65 and 
62  Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Concept of an Injured State’ in James Crawford and others (eds), The Law 
of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 944.
63  ECT (n 13) arts 5, 7, 29. 
64  Azaria (n 7) 89–94: the 2004 Belarus–Russia gas export/transit dispute; the 2006 and 2009 
Ukraine–Russia gas transit/export disputes; the 2007 Belarus–Russia oil transit/export dispute; 
the 2010 interruption of gas transit by Belarus.
65  Nabucco Agreement (n 38) art 3.1.
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the TAP Treaty is in furtherance of the ECT.66 All these provisions may indicate 
that parties do not intend to depart from their ECT obligations. However, it is 
unclear that they included such treaty provisions specifically owing to the erga 
omnes partes nature of the ECT trade and transit obligations. In light of the lack of 
evidence to the contrary, it is better to argue that ECT trade and transit obligations 
are bilateralisable.
2.2.3 Environmental Obligations
Article 19 on ‘Environmental Aspects’ sets out erga omnes partes obligations.67 
Article 19 of the ECT comprises three paragraphs.68 Paragraph 1 consists of a chapeau, 
containing framework obligations, and a (non-exhaustive) list of obligations 
specifying the obligations in the chapeau. The chapeau establishes an obligation 
on Contracting Parties to ‘strive to minimize in an economically efficient manner 
harmful Environmental Impacts occurring either within or outside its Area from 
all operations within the Energy Cycle in its Area’.69 Unlike the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), where the term ‘Area’ defines a space beyond national 
jurisdiction, the term ‘Area’ in the ECT expressly means spaces within national 
jurisdiction.70 Additionally, contrary to customary international law, which only 
requires that states prevent significant transboundary harm,71 Article 19 deals with 
66  TAP Treaty (n 39) Preamble.
67  ECT (n 13) art 19. 
68  For an overview of ECT (n 13) art 19, see Clare Shine, ‘Environmental Protection under the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas Walde (ed), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East–West 
Gateway for Investment and Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996) 520.
69  ECT (n 13) art 19(1). The wording ‘shall strive’ does not affect the normative character of the 
rule. The obligation is one of conduct, and the question is about the manner in which, and the 
time at which, such obligation is to be breached. 
70  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into 
force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS). Compare UNCLOS art 1(1) and ECT (n 
13) art 1(10).
71  Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 
(3rd edn, OUP 2009) 137, 167; In opposition, see Phillippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel with 
Adriana Fabra and Ruth MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn, 
CUP 2012) 201; International case law has only found violations of the obligation not to cause 
(and subsequently to prevent) transboundary harm (or harm in the context of a shared resource), 
not of harm to the environment within one state’s jurisdiction. See Trail Smelter Case (United 
States v Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA, 1965; Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits, Judgment) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 4; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
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any environmental harm occurring outside the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party 
where the harmful energy activity takes place, as well as with environmental harm 
occurring within the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party, in whose jurisdiction 
the harmful energy activity takes place. In the absence of a requirement connecting 
jurisdiction and harm, there is no evidence that the obligation in Article 19(1) is 
based on a bilateral relationship between Contracting Parties, whose environment 
would be affected by a harmful energy activity in another Contracting Party. Rather, 
the obligation protects a community interest—the environment per se. It is better 
classified as an obligation erga omnes partes. 
2.2.4 Dispute Settlement Provisions and Standing
The ECT contains numerous dispute settlement mechanisms—a general inter-
Contracting Party arbitration mechanism in Article 27; an investor-Contracting 
Party arbitration provision in Article 26; a special transit conciliation procedure 
in Article 7(7); a special provision for the settlement of environmental disputes 
in Article 19(2) and a special procedure for settling trade disputes concerning 
Articles 5 and 29 in Annex D. Since none of these provisions contains detailed rules 
concerning standing, standing to resort to ECT dispute settlement depends on the 
nature of each obligation breached. 
Given that the transit obligations under Article 7 are bilateralisable, only 
individually injured Contracting Parties can resort to conciliation or to general 
inter-Contracting Party dispute resolution.72 Similarly, as the investment obligations 
in Part III are bilateralisable, only individually injured Contracting Parties 
may resort to general inter-Contracting Party dispute settlement.73 Since trade 
obligations under Articles 5 and 29 are bilateralisable, standing to resort to Annex 
ICJ Rep 226, 242 para 29; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) 
[2010] ICJ Rep 14, para 101; Cf Iron Rhine ‘IJZEREN RIJN’ Railway (Belgium v Netherlands) 
(2005) 27 RIAA para 59. However, the relevant passage in the latter award could be interpreted 
as recognising an obligation to prevent environmental harm generally only by taking the 
tribunal’s reasoning out of the dispute’s context: the harm at issue would be caused by activities 
of one state (Belgium) taking place in the territory of another state (the Netherlands).
72  ECT (n 13) art 27. 
73  Pursuant to ECT (n 13) art 27(2) the inter-Contracting Parties arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction over disputes concerning the application and interpretation of all provisions in 
Part III on Investment Promotion and Protection. However, art 27(2) expressly excludes from 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction disputes concerning the application and interpretation of the last 
sentence of art 10(1) and only for Contracting Parties listed in Annex IA.
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D should be available only to individually injured Contracting Parties. However, 
although Annex D does not specifically provide for standing, it is arguable that, 
given the effort of the negotiating parties of the ECT to parallelise Annex D to 
the WTO DSU, Annex D may be interpreted as affording generous standing to all 
Contracting Parties.74 Finally, given that environmental obligations are erga omnes 
partes, any Contracting Party may resort to dispute resolution under Article 19(2).
2.3 Bespoke Pipeline Treaties between EU Member States and Third States
In the post-Cold War period, the trend to conclude bespoke pipeline treaties has 
been increasing. A number of reasons may have prompted this trend, but this 
question falls beyond the scope of this study.75 This treaty practice is by no means 
unique to Europe. Numerous such treaties have been concluded in relation to 
cross-border and transit pipelines in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.76 
However, the treaty practice involving EU Member States is of interest 
because of the context in which it is taking place. First, it can be seen as a reaction 
to the need to diversify routes and sources in the aftermath of the 2009 gas crisis 
that occurred in Europe owing to the gas transit and export dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine. Second, it will continue to be observed—if not to increase—as many 
of these projects are eligible for funding by the EU, when characterised as ‘projects 
of common interest’ under Decision No 1364/200677 or as ‘priority corridors’ under 
74  No subsequent practice of Contracting Parties supports this interpretation as yet.
75  Azaria (n 7) 7, 58.
76  For instance, see Treaty on the West African Gas Pipeline Project between Benin, Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Togo (31 January 2003) <http://www.wagpa.org/Treaty_on_WAGP_Project.pdf> 
accessed 28 September 2016; Agreement among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey Relating 
to the Transportation of Petroleum via the Territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey 
Through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline (signed 18 November 1999, entered 
into force 9 October 2000) <http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/BTC/Eng/agmt4/agmt4.pdf> 
accessed 28 September 2016; Agreement between Kazakhstan and China on cooperation in 
the construction and operation of gas pipeline Kazakhstan-China (signed 18 August 2007), 
Kazakhstan OJ No 218-IV; Agreement between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates Relating 
to the Transmission of Gas by Pipeline Between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (signed 
26 September 2004, entered into force 9 July 2005) <http://www.almeezan.qa/AgreementsPage.
aspx?id=1483&language=en> accessed 28 September 2016. 
77  Decision No 1364/2006/EC [2006] OJ L262/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing 
Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC.
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Regulation 347/2013,78 with a view to reinforcing the security of energy supplies 
by strengthening relations with third countries.79 Third, the compatibility with EU 
law, especially competition law and the internal energy market legislation, of the 
treaties and other arrangements for these projects has been a matter of concern for 
the European Commission.80 From the point of view of public international law, 
EU Member States may conclude treaties with third states, but they remain obliged 
to comply with their existing EU law obligations. If there is an incompatibility 
between treaty provisions with third parties and EU law provisions, the treaty with 
the third states will be the applicable legal standard between them and the third 
state, while the applicable legal standard in their relationship with EU Member 
States will be EU law.81 EU Member States will incur responsibility for the breach 
of EU law obligations.82 A possible solution may be to withdraw from the treaties 
with a third state, which can take place either in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of these treaties or in the absence of such provisions, by reference to 
extraneous grounds under custom or the VCLT, where applicable;83 or to pursue 
the amendment of these treaties with a view to ensuring compatibility with EU 
law.84 However, both choices are politically and procedurally cumbersome. For 
states that became EU Member States after the conclusion of treaties with third 
78  Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 [2013] OJ L115/39 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing 
Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 
and (EC) No 715/2009. This Regulation includes a list of ‘priority corridors’ that are eligible for 
EU financial aid (art 6(3)).
79  The Nabucco Pipeline was listed in Annex III of Decision No 1364/2006/EC (n 77) as a project 
of common interest, and was eligible for EU financial aid (art 6(3)); Regulation (EU) No 
347/2013 (n 78) included a list of priority corridors that include all EU Member States in 
whose territory the Nabucco pipeline would be constructed; the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline has 
been listed since 2006 in Annex III of Decision 1364/2006/EC (n 77) as a project of common 
interest and is eligible for EU financial aid (art 6(3) and s 9.25, Annex III).
80  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental 
agreements and non-binding instruments between Member States and third countries in the 
field of energy and repealing Decision No 994/2012/EU COM (2016) 53 final (Commission’s 
Proposal for Regulation repealing Decision No 994) para 4. 
81  VCLT (n 34) art 30(4)(b). 
82  ibid art 30(5). 
83  None of the grounds for termination under the VCLT and custom permit termination on the 
ground that one or more of the treaty parties are obliged to comply with other conflicting 
international obligations.
84  VCLT (n 34) art 40. 
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states that are incompatible with EU law (eg Croatia concluded a bilateral treaty 
with Russia concerning the South Stream pipeline prior to its accession to the EU), 
TFEU Article 351 provides that the TFEU does not affect such treaties.85 However, 
to the extent that they are incompatible with the TFEU, the Member States(s) are 
obliged to ‘take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established’.86 
EU Member States are thus obliged under EU law either to amend treaties with 
third states or to withdraw from them.
Fourth, in February 2016, the European Commission proposed amending 
Decision No 994/2012.87 Under the proposed amendment, EU Member States 
would be obliged to abstain from expressing consent to be bound by treaties with 
third states in the energy sector (including bespoke pipeline treaties) before the 
European Commission has made an assessment as to the compatibility of such 
treaties with EU law. Member States would also be obliged to ‘take (into) utmost 
account’ the European Commission’s assessment when concluding the negotiation 
of such treaties.88 Fifth, existing EU law and the proposal of the Commission to 
amend existing EU law favours multilateral treaties with third states. This express 
preference implies that the Commission may not favour bilateral energy-related 
treaties.89
Against this background, it is valuable to examine bespoke pipeline treaties 
between EU Member States and third states: two plurilateral treaties (the Nabucco 
Agreement and the TAP Treaty), and the bilateral treaties for the South Stream 
pipeline. The term ‘plurilateral bespoke pipeline treaties’ is to be contrasted with 
‘bilateral bespoke pipeline treaties’, and with ‘multilateral treaties’ (eg the WTO 
Agreement and the ECT),90 which are not tailor-made for a particular pipeline. The 
85  TFEU (n 3) art 351; Case 812/79 Attorney General v Juan C Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, para 8; 
Case C-84/98 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I–5215, para 53; For an overview of TFEU 
art 351, see Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2011) 396–436.
86  TFEU (n 3) art 351; where necessary, the Member States must assist each other with a view to 
eliminating the incompatibilities established and must adopt, where appropriate, a common 
attitude. ‘[T]he Commission (…) may facilitate mutual assistance between the Member States 
concerned and their adoption of a common attitude’. Case C-205/06 Commission v Republic of 
Austria [2009] ECR I–1301, para 44.
87  Decision No 994/2012/EU [2012] OJ L299/13 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard 
to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of 
energy.
88  Commission’s Proposal for Regulation Repealing Decision No 994 (n 80) art 5(4).
89  ibid art 9(d); Decision No 994/2012/EU (n 87) art 7.
90  WTO Agreement (n 13); ECT (n 13). 
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use of the term ‘plurilateral’ here is only descriptive of the treaties’ form (which is 
multilateral) and does not entail legal consequences under the law of treaties in 
relation to the topic discussed here. Each treaty and each treaty obligation has to 
be interpreted separately. The following analysis focuses on obligations concerning 
uninterrupted energy flows via the pipelines.
2.3.1 Plurilateral Bespoke Pipeline Treaties
The Nabucco Agreement requires treaty parties ‘not to permit or require the 
Interruption of gas transportation in the Nabucco (pipeline)’.91 The treaty’s object 
and purpose is to ensure the ‘security of supply (since) this is necessary for the 
welfare and security of each citizen and (…) States Parties are therefore determined 
to act in a spirit of solidarity to achieve collective energy security’.92 The TAP Treaty 
requires parties not to interrupt flows of gas through the pipeline.93 The Preamble 
of the Treaty states that the Treaty forms part of an effort to promote cooperation 
in ensuring the reliable supply of gas from states in Central Asia to the EU, none 
of which is party to the Treaty, and ‘to create uniform (…) conditions and standards 
for the (…) construction, and operation of (the Pipeline)’.94 Additionally, the Treaty 
categorically prohibits unilateral denunciations and inter se modifications.95 
The obligations not to interrupt transportation of energy via an integral 
pipeline system, which crosses the territory of numerous states, could be classified 
as ‘interdependent obligations’. What connects interdependent obligations is their 
negative nature: they require states, for instance, not to acquire arms or not to acquire 
nuclear weapons. As in relation to interdependent obligations, parties to bespoke 
pipeline treaties have a strong interest in cessation of the international wrongful 
act pertaining to the interruption of energy carriage, restitution and assurances 
of non-repetition rather than in compensation. Their interest is to guarantee the 
‘regime’ by re-establishing energy flows. Owing to these features, this could be seen 
as the natural classification of obligations concerning energy transportation via 
pipelines in the context of multilateral bespoke pipeline treaties unless there is 
evidence to the contrary, which is the case for the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP 
91  Nabucco Agreement (n 38) art 7. 
92  ibid art 1.2 (emphasis added). 
93  TAP Treaty (n 39) art 7. 
94  ibid Preamble (emphasis added).
95  ibid art 12. 
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Treaty. The features of the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty demonstrated 
above support the proposition that the obligations concerning uninterrupted 
energy flows therein are erga omnes partes. They are established primarily for a 
common interest (collective energy security), including a wider common interest 
of states beyond the treaty parties, and they are intended to set uniform standards 
for a regional project. 
This section has shown that two plurilateral bespoke pipeline treaties that 
EU Member States have concluded with third states establish obligations erga 
omnes partes and thus all treaty parties have standing to invoke responsibility 
(although it is questionable whether those other than the injured state may resort 
to countermeasures).96 The following section touches on the bilateral treaties that 
EU Member States and third states in the Balkan region have concluded with 
Russia concerning the South Stream pipeline.
2.3.2 Bilateral Bespoke Pipeline Treaties
In addition to multilateral treaties governing the construction and operation of 
one physically indivisible pipeline that crosses the territory of numerous states, the 
practice of states also reveals compounds of bilateral treaties concluded for such 
projects. A paradigmatic example of European interest is the bilateral treaties 
concluded between Russia, a gas exporting state, on the one hand, and each transit 
and importing state for the South Stream pipeline on the other hand, some of which 
are EU Member States.97 These include provisions concerning the construction and 
operation of the pipeline, including an obligation not to interrupt energy carriage.
Owing to the vehicle used to establish such obligations (bilateral treaties), 
the obligations under each treaty are bilateral and are owed between the parties to 
them. There is no evidence in the treaties that EU Member States have concluded 
with Russia or in the circumstances of their conclusion that there is an intention 
to establish rights (eg concerning uninterrupted transportation) for third states 
through whose territory the pipeline will be constructed or for a wider group of 
states.98
96  See (n 24–32).
97  See (n 40). For compatibility of the provisions in these treaties with EU law provisions, see 
analysis in section 2.3 above. 
98  VCLT (n 34) art 36.
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2.4 Interim Conclusions
Within the ambit of international energy law, community interest obligations 
appear in the treaty practice of Member States (eg obligations in bespoke pipeline 
treaties with third states, such as the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty) and 
in some multilateral treaties to which the EU is itself a party (eg ECT environmental 
obligations). However, the EU and Member States have also undertaken bilateral 
or bilateralisable obligations in the energy sector. WTO obligations apply to energy 
trade and are bilateralisable; but generous standing has been afforded to all WTO 
members to invoke responsibility for breaches of WTO obligations under the 
DSU. The ECT contains some bilateralisable obligations, such as those concerning 
trade, transit and investment. Furthermore, EU Member States conclude bilateral 
treaties with third states in the energy sector (eg with Russia for the South Stream 
pipeline). This section has explained that community interest obligations appear 
along with bilateral and bilateralisable obligations within the scope of international 
energy law that are of particular interest for the EU and Member States, and how 
this determines standing to implement the responsibility for a breach of these 
obligations. The following section examines whether lawful countermeasures, 
as a means of implementing international responsibility, can take the form of 
suspending compliance with energy-related obligations.
3 Suspending Compliance with Community Interest Obligations 
in International Energy Law
This section examines energy-related countermeasures. Countermeasures are a 
means of implementing international responsibility.99 They involve the suspension 
of compliance with an international obligation, but because they are taken in 
response to a previously internationally wrongful act, countermeasures are one of 
the circumstances that preclude wrongfulness.100 The following analysis assesses 
whether, and if so how, the community interest nature of obligations plays a role 
in determining the lawfulness of a countermeasure in the form of suspending 
compliance with treaty obligations relating to the energy sector. This analysis is 
important because resorting to energy-related countermeasures may be preferred 
99  ILC (n 15) Part III arts 49–53. 
100  ibid Part I art 22.
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among the available responses to wrongfulness in the UN era, given their significant 
effects on the responsible state and their corresponding persuasiveness. 
Section 3.1 examines whether countermeasures in the form of suspending 
compliance with treaty obligations in the energy sector are unavailable. Section 
3.2 examines whether countermeasures in the form of suspending compliance 
with obligations in the energy sector may not meet the conditions of lawfulness of 
countermeasures to the extent that the latter take into account community interest 
obligations.
3.1 Displacing Countermeasures as Circumstances Precluding 
Wrongfulness
The argument that countermeasures as circumstances precluding wrongfulness may 
be displaced by lex specialis is founded on two separate bases—treaty language that 
displaces countermeasures, as circumstances precluding wrongfulness; and the 
nature of the obligations whose performance is to be suspended implicitly displaces 
countermeasures. First, some treaties concerning energy trade and investment 
contain security exceptions—for instance, GATT Article XXI and ECT Article 
24. The relationship between security exceptions and circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness under the law of state responsibility has been the focus of a series 
of investor-state arbitrations against Argentina on the basis of bilateral investment 
treaties to which Argentina is party. While a number of arbitral tribunals have dealt 
with this issue differently,101 the more persuasive position is that when the language 
used in a security exception is (or resembles substantially) ‘nothing shall prevent 
the parties from’, as is the language used in GATT Article XXI and ECT Article 
24, such language suggests that the exception delineates the scope of primary 
treaty obligations. Conduct within the scope of the exceptions is not in breach 
of the treaty obligations. In contrast, circumstances precluding wrongfulness are 
part of secondary rules and preclude the wrongfulness of a conduct that would 
otherwise be wrongful: meaning conduct that would not fall within the scope of 
101  Treaty exceptions are lex specialis and supersede the customary circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness: LG&E v Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability) (ICSID Case No ARB/02/1) 
3 October 2006, paras 245–61; Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of the Congo (Decision 
on the Application for Annulment of the Award) (ICSID Case No ARB/99/7) 1 November 
2006, para 55; interpreting treaty exceptions through VCLT (n 33) art 31(3)(c) to incorporate 
conditions from secondary rules under custom: CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine 
Republic (Award of the Tribunal) (ICSID Case No ARB/01/8) 12 May 2005, paras 315–82.
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such security exceptions.102 This was also the reasoning of the PCIJ in the Railway 
Traffic Advisory Opinion (1931).103 
Most bespoke pipeline treaties do not contain security exception provisions, 
as is the case of those examined here. However, some contain other language that 
may displace countermeasures, as circumstances precluding wrongfulness. The TAP 
Treaty permits non-performance of treaty obligations only by prior consent of all 
parties. This rule is located in a provision that deals with the treaty’s operation that 
is separate from the provisions requiring states not to interrupt energy flows.104 The 
argument could be made that this treaty provision displaces countermeasures under 
the law of international responsibility taken in this particular form (meaning in the 
form of interrupting energy flows). The provision overlaps with countermeasures 
in that they both relate to suspension of performance of obligations, but it deviates 
from countermeasures, which are unilateral and are not premised on prior consent 
by the responsible state or any other state. Such interpretation would entail the 
displacement of any unilaterally operational circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
Second, as a separate argument, the community interest nature of some 
obligations of international energy law could be seen as entailing ipso facto non-
susceptibility to unilateral countermeasures. In his work on state responsibility, ILC 
Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz suggested that, owing to their indivisible nature, 
erga omnes partes obligations may not be susceptible to countermeasures.105 However, 
his proposal was not taken up by the ILC—it was rather changed into a clause that 
severs the preclusion of wrongfulness towards the responsible state from the non-
preclusion of wrongfulness towards the non-responsible affected states.106 The 
approach of the ASR in relation to this issue may cast some doubt on the argument 
that countermeasures in the form of suspending performance of erga omnes partes 
obligations are displaced owing to the indivisible nature of such obligations. 
102  ILC (n 15) 7; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (Decision of the ad 
hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic) (ICSID Case 
No ARB/01/8) 25 September 2007, paras 129–35; Sempra Energy International v Argentine 
Republic (Ad hoc Committee, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of 
the Award) (ICSID Case No ARB/02/16) 29 June 2010, paras 200–04.
103  Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Railway Sector Landwarów-Kaisiadorys) 
(Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Rep Series A/B, No 39, 107.
104  TAP Treaty (n 39) art 12. 
105  Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’ (1992) II ILCYB; UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.1 (Part 1) paras 92–93.
106  ILC (n 15) 130 and art 49.
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The following section examines whether suspending performance of energy-
related obligations meets the conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures under 
custom, assuming that countermeasures are not displaced by lex specialis.
3.2 Conditions of Lawfulness of Countermeasures under Customary 
International Law
Countermeasures, in order to be lawful, have to meet a number of conditions under 
customary international law.107 One of these conditions is that a countermeasure 
has to be targeted against the responsible state.108 This condition—according to 
the ILC—is based on the ‘relative preclusion of wrongfulness’.109 The wrongfulness 
of the countermeasure is precluded vis-à-vis the responsible state, but not vis-à-
vis a third non-responsible state. For instance, if Ukraine suspends compliance 
with transit obligations that it owes to Russia as a countermeasure for the latter’s 
internationally wrongful act, while at the same time it owes a transit obligation 
to the EU and/or Member States (eg GATT Article V or ECT Article 7), the 
wrongfulness of interrupting transit vis-à-vis Russia may be precluded, but it will 
not be precluded vis-à-vis the EU and Member States simply owing to Russia’s 
wrongful conduct. In such situations, reacting states are faced with a dilemma. 
They may respond against the responsible state, but they will have to make 
reparations to third (not responsible) states; or they may abstain from resorting 
to countermeasures against the responsible state (at least in this particular form), 
owing to the burden of having to make reparations to third states. 
On the other hand, other conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures may be 
attuned to the community interest nature of international obligations. Some reflect 
the need to protect community interests per se; others may coincidentally allow 
the consideration of the community interest nature of a primary obligation when 
assessing the lawfulness of a countermeasure. Two conditions of the lawfulness of 
countermeasures are discussed in the following sequence—that countermeasures 
shall not affect fundamental human rights obligations and that they have to be 
proportionate to the injury suffered.110
107  ILC (n 15) arts 49–53.
108  ibid art 49(1).
109  ibid 130.
110  ibid arts 50–51. 
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3.2.1 Prohibition of an Effect on Fundamental Human Rights Obligations
If individuals are deprived of sufficient heating, water, sanitation and medical 
assistance or the use of medical equipment in hospitals or at home due to 
interruptions to the supply of electricity, oil and gas, there may be loss of life, or 
individuals may be subject to degrading treatment or their health may be put at 
risk. This is far from an academic discussion. During the 2009 gas crisis in Europe, 
deaths were reported in Poland and Bulgaria.111 
The rule that countermeasures shall not ‘affect obligations for the protection 
of fundamental human rights’112 covers two situations: where the state resorting to 
the countermeasure suspends compliance with its human rights obligations per 
se; and where the state resorting to the countermeasure suspends compliance with 
other international obligations and in so doing affects its human rights obligations. 
It is this second situation that relates to countermeasures in the form of energy-
trade restrictions. 
However, this prohibition faces numerous limitations. The following analysis 
touches on two of these limitations:113 the extraterritorial application of human 
rights obligations, and the effect on human rights.
3.2.1.1 Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights
Human rights obligations apply within the territory of the state resorting to 
countermeasures (‘reacting state’), and extraterritorially, where the reacting 
state exercises control. Unlike situations where state organs are present in areas 
outside the state’s territory and exercise control over a particular area114 or over a 
111  Bilefsky and Kramer (n 7).
112  ILC (n 15) art 50. 
113  Another limitation is that ASR art 50 (n 15) refers to ‘fundamental human rights’, which 
implies a smaller group of obligations within human rights generally. The term cannot mean 
only human rights that are found in jus cogens norms; such requirement would be superfluous, 
since the requirement that countermeasures do not affect obligations jus cogens is a separate 
condition for lawfulness (ASR art 50(1)(d)); the term ‘fundamental human rights’ was 
proposed by Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz based on the distinction adopted at the time between 
‘core’ or ‘basic’ human rights and ‘other’ human rights. Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz (n 
105) para 80; For further analysis: Azaria (n 7) 234–36.
114  Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) Series A no 310, para 62; In relation to 
full and exclusive control over a prison or a ship respectively, see Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v 
United Kingdom App No 61498/08 (ECtHR, 30 June 2009) paras 86–89; Medvedyev and others 
v France App No 3394/03 (ECtHR, 20 March 2010) para 67.
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particular individual,115 interrupting energy exports or transit involves conduct in 
the territory of the reacting state that produces effects on individuals located in the 
territory of the responsible state (‘targeted state’). 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning 
territorial conduct, which has extraterritorial effects, is limited. However, the 
ECtHR has considered that individuals fall within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a state within 
the meaning of Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),116 
in circumstances where its organs are located within its own territory (or where 
the state exercises effective control) but are in close vicinity to the victims that are 
located in another state and there is a direct and immediate causal link between 
their conduct and the effect on the individual concerned.117 
Interruptions of energy exports or transit may in certain circumstances fulfill 
the vicinity and the causation link criteria, for instance, where the importing state 
is wholly dependent on established energy flows from the exporter or the transit 
route. Such instances include Belarus’ dependence on Russia’s exports of gas, and 
the dependence of Moldova on gas transiting through Ukraine and gas exports 
from Russia.118 However, the case law where such a threshold has been established 
is confined to obligations to abstain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights.119 
States are obliged not to kill, not to subject individuals to degrading treatment, 
and not to put at risk the health of individuals that are located in the territory of 
another state. By contrast, it is doubtful that obligations to take positive measures 
115  Öcalan v Turkey App No 46221/99 (ECtHR, 12 May 2005) para 91. 
116  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8 and 
11) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR). 
117  Andreou v Turkey App no 45653/99 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008), section A.3(c); Additional 
support for the Court’s reasoning in this respect can be drawn from Nada v Switzerland 
App no 10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 2012). The claimant resided in an Italian enclave 
surrounded by Switzerland. The ECtHR presumed that the individual fell within Switzerland’s 
‘jurisdiction’ without giving reasons (para 122). It found that, by prohibiting the claimant 
from entering or transiting through its territory, Switzerland violated his right to private life. 
Neither Switzerland nor any intervening state objected on the grounds that Nada was outside 
Switzerland’s ‘jurisdiction’. The exceptional situation, which involved an enclave of 1.6 square 
kilometres of Italian territory, where the claimant resided, may have prompted the Court’s 
reasoning, but Switzerland’s conduct was conduct that took place within its own territory 
albeit that it produced extraterritorial effects.
118  See n 8. 
119  Andreou v Turkey App no 45653/99 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008); Nada v Switzerland App no 
10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 2012).
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to protect the right to life, freedom from degrading treatment or the right to health 
by providing energy apply in such an extraterritorial manner. No case law or state 
practice as yet supports (albeit it does not preclude) the view that obligations to 
take positive measures to protect human rights apply in such manner.120
3.2.1.2 ‘Effect’ on Human Rights Obligations
Even assuming arguendo that the ‘jurisdiction’ threshold was to be fulfilled,121 it 
would have to be proven that the effect on the human rights of individuals in the 
targeted state is the result of the countermeasure. Such a link depends on the facts, 
and may not be easily identified. Furthermore, the reacting state may argue against 
the existence of such a link because the targeted state has not taken the necessary 
measures to protect the human rights of individuals within its own territory. For 
example, the reacting state could have mitigated the effects of an energy crisis 
by taking pre-emptive or other measures such as storage or entering into energy 
sharing mechanisms like the International Energy Agency mechanism of oil 
stockpiling and demand restraints or the EU Gas Security mechanism.122 Hence, in 
the current state of international law, the rule that countermeasures cannot affect 
human rights obligations is unlikely to result in countermeasures in the form of 
interrupting energy flows being unlawful. 
3.2.2 Proportionality
Under customary international law, countermeasures have to be proportionate 
to the injury suffered, taking into account the rights in question.123 The following 
sections explain how the condition of proportionality of countermeasures 
accommodates community interest obligations. First, the effects on human rights 
120  For counterarguments that may support the extraterritorial application of obligations and the 
conduct discussed here, see Azaria (n 7) 243–44.
121  As a separate matter, there is no evidence that a stricter jurisdictional link is required for the 
customary right to life and freedom from inhuman treatment, or the right to health (assuming 
that it attains customary status) other than the one applicable to human rights treaties.
122  Agreement on an International Energy Program (concluded 18 November 1974, entered into 
force 19 January 1976) 1040 UNTS 271, arts 2–3; Council and Parliament Regulation (EU) 
994/2010 (n 9). 
123  ILC (n 15) art 51; Gabčνkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 85.
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obligations of the targeted state will be discussed, and second, how the condition 
of proportionality takes into account the community interest nature of obligations 
whose performance is suspended as a countermeasure. In relation to the former 
issue, the question as to the existence of a human right to energy will be touched on. 
The analysis is put in the context of treaties to which all EU Member States are party 
(as at 28 September 2016): the ECHR and the European Social Charter (ESC).124
3.2.2.1 Effects on Human Rights Obligations of the Targeted State: A Human Right 
to Energy?
Countermeasures in the form of suspending compliance with exports or transit of 
energy can affect the ability of the targeted state to perform its own human rights 
obligations vis-à-vis individuals within its own territory. These include obligations 
to respect human rights by abstention and obligations to protect human rights 
by positive action. A countermeasure that has such an effect is likely to be 
disproportionate to the injury suffered, taking into account the rights in question. 
Since this criterion covers the rights of the injured and responsible states,125 the 
argument can be made that it also covers the ability of the targeted state to comply 
with its human rights obligations.
It is in this context that the question arises as to whether there is a ‘human 
right to energy’. There is no human rights treaty specifically establishing the right 
to energy, or referring to energy in connection with the rights established in the 
treaty.126 However, the interpretation of existing treaties may establish obligations 
not to arbitrarily deprive access to energy in relation to vulnerable individuals 
(especially those dependent on the state) and especially in cases where such 
deprivation has no connection to the conduct of the individuals in question (eg 
non-payment of utility bills). Such an argument can also be made in relation to 
customary human rights law, where available. 
124  European Social Charter (adopted 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965) 529 
UNTS 89.
125  ILC (n 15) 135.
126  The only exception is Article 14(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (adopted 19 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 
13. The Article obliges parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in rural areas and, in particular, to ensure their right to enjoy adequate 
living conditions, particularly in relation to electricity. This provision is limited in scope of 
beneficiaries (‘women in rural areas’) and purpose (‘elimination of discrimination’).
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Access to energy (oil, gas or electricity) is central for heating, cooking, use 
of medical equipment at home and hospitals, and for ensuring access to water, 
including for the purposes of sanitation. In light of this, it may be argued that 
when states arbitrarily deprive individuals of access to energy they may violate 
their obligation not to employ degrading treatment, their obligation to protect the 
right to life, their obligation to respect individuals’ right to health, and the right 
to housing under human rights treaties (and customary international law, where 
available), such as the ECHR and the ESC.
The question has far-reaching implications for states—would such a right 
include only access to electricity or also gas and oil; or does it require states to 
provide uninterrupted energy or ensure the uninterrupted provision of energy 
by private entities (in cases other than non-payment of utility bills), and under 
which conditions (for free, on payment and if so, what would be the charges)? 
These issues fall beyond the scope of this study which examines a different issue—
access to energy in situations where individuals already have access to energy, and 
where provision of energy is interrupted for reasons that do not have to do with 
the human right-holder.
In relation to degrading treatment, in 1991, the European Commission on 
Human Rights rejected the admissibility of a complaint which argued that Belgium 
violated ECHR Article 3 because ‘in the case at issue, the cutting off or the threat of 
cutting off electricity did not reach the level of humiliation or debasement needed 
for there to be inhuman or degrading treatment’.127 This decision does not rule out 
the possibility that interfering with access to electricity may meet the threshold 
of treatment that would be inhuman or degrading. However, the decision did 
not provide detailed reasoning. Subsequent case law of the ECtHR has taken 
into account a number of the conditions present in the case of the applicant in 
this case, when it has accepted that a breach of ECHR Article 3 has taken place. 
The conditions that the European Commission on Human Rights could have 
considered include the applicant’s economic conditions, her mental and physical 
state (she suffered from depression and respiratory problems), the duration of the 
lack of electricity and the weather conditions during which it took place, and the 
fact that the facilities in her residence allowed for no alternative energy sources.128 
127  Francine van Volsem v Belgium App No 14641/89 (Commission Decision, 9 May 1990) 3 
(emphasis added).
128  Antonio Cassese, ‘Can the Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Be Applied to Socio-
Economic Conditions?’ (1991) 2 EJIL 141, 141–45.
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Additionally, subsequent ECtHR case law has clarified that the ‘absence of 
(…) a purpose (to humiliate) cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation 
of Article 3’.129 Moreover, a breach of Article 3 may occur ‘in circumstances (where 
the individual is) wholly dependent on State support, (and is) faced with official 
indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or incompatible with 
human dignity’.130 Interruption of access to energy for heating, sanitation, light, 
cooking or the use of essential medical equipment to individuals dependent on the 
state may amount to a violation of their right to be free from degrading treatment 
under ECHR Article 3. They may also amount to a breach of the right to health, as 
part of the right to private life.131 Moreover, in relation to the ESC, the European 
Committee of Social Rights has recognised in its long-standing case law that the 
right to adequate housing under ESC Article 31(1) includes a dwelling with ‘all 
basic amenities such as water, heating (...) and electricity (...)’.132 In relation to 
vulnerable individuals dependent on the state, interruption of energy for heating, 
sanitation, and cooking and medical support may constitute degrading treatment, 
a breach of the right to health, or a breach of the right to adequate housing. 
To some extent, EU secondary legislation (incidentally) is compatible with 
the obligations of EU Member States under the ECHR: Article 3(3) of Directive 
2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
requires EU Member States to: 
take appropriate measures to protect final customers, [and] in particular, [to] ensure 
that there are adequate safeguards to protect vulnerable customers. [E]ach Member 
State shall define the concept of vulnerable customers which may refer to energy 
poverty and, inter alia, to the prohibition of disconnection of gas to such customers 
in critical times.133 
129  Valašinas v Lithuania App No 44558/98 (ECtHR, 24 July 2001) para 101.
130  MSS v Belgium and Greece App No 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011) para 253. 
131  ECHR (n 116) art 8; Nada v Switzerland (n 117) para 151; Glor v Switzerland App No 13444/04 
(ECtHR, 30 April 2009) para 54.
132  Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy, Complaint No 58/2009 (ECSR, 25 
June 2010) para 54.
133  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC [2009] 
OJ L211/94; In relation to electricity, see similar provisions in Article 3, Directive 2009/72/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for 
the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55.
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However, the ECHR (and other international obligations of EU Member States) 
may require further measures vis-à-vis vulnerable individuals, and the protection 
of a wider group of individuals than those protected by Directive 2009/73.134 
In extreme situations, where the targeted state is placed in a position where 
it cannot comply with its negative and positive obligations concerning the right 
to life, the right to be free from degrading treatment, and the right to health,135 
owing to an interruption of energy exports or transit by a reacting state, such 
countermeasure would be disproportionate.
3.2.2.2 In Relation to Targeting Community Interest Obligations
As a separate matter, targeting community interest obligations may not meet the 
condition of proportionality. The reasoning of the ICJ in Gabčνkovo-Nagymaros 
supports this interpretation. Hungary had violated a bilateral treaty with Slovakia, 
which required both States to construct works for energy development on a part 
of the River Danube crossing the two States. Slovakia unilaterally responded by 
diverting a part of the river and by constructing alternative works along the course 
of the diversion. Slovakia claimed that its conduct was a lawful countermeasure 
against Hungary’s prior breach. The ICJ found that ‘[t]he effects of a countermeasure 
must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights in 
question’.136 
The Court did not explain the criteria by which it assessed proportionality. It 
could be argued that the Court’s criterion was the aim pursued by Slovakia when 
resorting to the alleged countermeasure. Factually, Slovakia’s measures meant that 
the adverse effects of Hungary’s conduct were wiped out and Slovakia managed to 
134  First, the term ‘vulnerable customers’ within Directive 2009/73 (and Directive 2009/72 
concerning electricity) is to be determined by each EU Member State and, in any event, it does 
not necessarily coincide with the definition of vulnerable individuals as referred to in the case 
law of the ECtHR. Second, Directives 2009/73 and 2009/72 seem to require that disconnection 
from gas or electricity respectively cannot take place, but there is no equivalent obligation 
under EU law concerning oil.
135  The right to life and the right to be free from degrading treatment would qualify as ‘fundamental 
human rights’ within the meaning of the ASR. See ILC (n 15) art 50(1)(b); Special Rapporteur 
Arangio-Ruiz (n 105) paras 80–83; Given the close connection between the right to health 
and the right to life and freedom from degrading treatment, it may be argued that the right to 
health is also covered by the term ‘fundamental human rights’; See also Azaria (n 7) 236.
136  Gabčνkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 85. 
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enjoy unilaterally the benefits it would have enjoyed had Hungary performed its 
treaty obligations.137 Thus, the measure’s aim was not to induce Hungary to comply 
with its obligations but rather an attempt to benefit from non-compliance. 
Although this interpretation is defensible, especially in light of the facts, 
the Court’s reasoning in paragraph 85 of the Judgment allows for a different 
interpretation. The ICJ alluded to the findings of the PCIJ in River Oder concerning 
the creation of a ‘community of interest on a navigable river [which] becomes the 
basis for a common legal right’ (of navigation) of riparian states on international 
rivers.138 Although it did not specifically link the community interest nature 
of those obligations to the assessment of the lawfulness of the countermeasure 
in question, it made an analogy between the common legal right of navigation 
and the modern developments of international law concerning non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses. This reasoning allows for the argument that 
the community interest and hence indivisible nature of the obligation whose 
performance is being suspended as a countermeasure may be a qualitative criterion 
for measuring proportionality.139 For instance, given that the obligations concerning 
the protection of the environment in ECT Article 19 and the obligations concerning 
uninterrupted energy flows under the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty are 
erga omnes partes, suspending their performance would not constitute a lawful 
countermeasure because it would not meet the condition of proportionality. 
4 Conclusion
Reciprocity and the making of bilateral or bilateralisable obligations dominate 
international rules concerning the energy sector. While multilateral treaties that 
apply to energy trade (eg WTO Agreement) or specific to the energy sector (eg 
ECT) have been concluded since the end of the Cold War, the rise of multilateralism 
has not necessarily brought about community interest obligations in this field. For 
instance, GATT obligations and ECT obligations concerning trade and investment 
are bilateralisable. 
137  Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures’ 
(2001) 12 EJIL 889, 898–99. 
138  Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder 
(Judgment) PCIJ Rep Series A No 23, 5.
139  According to the ILC, the criteria for proportionality in the framework of the ASR are 
quantitative and qualitative. ILC (n 15) 134–35.
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However, to suggest that this is the whole picture would be misleading. The EU 
founding treaties and, by implication, the secondary sectoral legislation on energy 
do not establish reciprocal undertakings between EU Member States according 
to Van Gend Loos.140 But, even outside EU law, as a species of international law, 
contemporary treaty practice is growing in the form of ‘plurilateral’ bespoke pipeline 
treaties, and EU Member States have participated in this development. Some of 
these treaties contain obligations erga omnes partes concerning uninterrupted 
energy flows.
At the same time, the community interest nature of international obligations 
may be relevant in determining whether suspending compliance with them can 
be a lawful countermeasure. Some conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures 
protect community interests per se; others incidentally allow the consideration of 
the community interest nature of a primary obligation when assessing whether the 
conditions of lawfulness of a countermeasure have been met. The condition that 
countermeasures cannot affect fundamental human rights obligations is unlikely 
to render unlawful countermeasures in the form of interrupting energy supplies to 
the responsible state, because the human rights obligations of the state taking such 
countermeasures are unlikely to apply in such extraterritorial situations. However, 
the condition that countermeasures must be proportionate to the injury suffered 
may not be met in two cases. First, if the energy-related obligation, performance of 
which is suspended, is of a community interest nature, this nature is a criterion for 
measuring proportionality. Second, countermeasures in the form of interrupting 
energy flows may curtail the ability of the targeted state to comply with its own 
human rights obligations.
140  NV Algemene Transport (n 35).
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